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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
HERBERT BURTON, 
his wife, 
vs. 
ALAN 
wife 
Utah 
INN : 
H. COOMBS, 
and FLORENCE BURTON, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
CARLA H. COOMBS, his ) 
, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., a ) 
corporation and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR ) 
II, INC., a Utah corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Sup* Ct. No, 14245 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case is one wherein the Plaintiffs, HERBERT BURTON 
and FLORENCE BURTON, his wife, are seeking a money Judgment against 
Defendants, ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA.H. COOMBS, his wife, FOUR SEASONS 
MOTOR INN,, INC., a Utah corporation, and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN II, 
INC., a Utah corporation, as a result of an alleged breach of a 
management contract for the management of a motel complex in St. 
George, Utah, known as FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. The Defendant, 
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. seeks a money judgment against Plaintiffs 
on its Counterclaim on the basis of an alleged breach of the responsi-
bilities imposed on the Plaintiffs to manage under the terms of said 
management contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered Judgment 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in favor of Defendants, ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H. COOMBS, his wife, j 
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, II, INC., of no cause of action against each 
of said Defendants on the Plaintiffs1 Complaint, granted Judgment in 
the amount of $21,333.00 principal, together with interest of $1,050.C 
together with attorneys' fees in the amount of $10,000.00, for a totaJJ 
Judgment of $32,383.00 in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Defendarj 
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., a Utah corporation, and the trial court 
denied the relief sought by the Defendants and each of them on their 
Counterclaim. 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL I 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment awarded in favor 
of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, 
INC., or in the alternative that the case be remanded to the | 
trial court for a new trial. Appellant bases the request for reversal 
or remand on the grounds that the court erred as follows: 1 
1. In finding that the Defendant breached the original I 
management agreement; • I 
2. The trial court erred in failing to find Plaintiffs I 
in breach of the original management agreement; I 
3« The trial court erred in assessing damages against I 
Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. as follows: I 
(a) There is no basis for the assessment of I 
damages against this Defendant, as there is no I 
basis in fact or law for determining a breach of 
contract; I 
(b) The amount of damages assessed are excessive 
and no basis for the amount of Judgment entered 
by the court can be established from the facts or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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evidence, 
4. The finding by the trial court that the management 
agreement was a binding and effective contract between the Plaintiffs 
and the Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., was in error in that 
it was beyond the scope of the evidence, outside the scope of the 
pleadings and contrary to the request of any party to the action and 
not supported by the facts and evidence in the case* 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In November, 1971, Defendant, ALAN H. COOMBS, began con-
struction on a forty (40) unit motel in St. George, Utah. In 
February of 1972, Defendant COOMBS formed a corporation known as 
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN. On or about February 24, the corporation 
entered into an agreement with Plaintiffs, HERBERT and FLORENCE BURTON, 
wherein they agreed to purchase twenty per cent of the corporation 
stock for $80,000.00. In addition, said agreement provided (1) that 
BURTONS would be given a Management Contract, whereby they could have 
the right to manage the forty unit motel; and (2) that BURTONS would 
have first option to invest in a second motel which was contemplated 
to be built directly across the street, with the same name. The terms 
of the Management Agreement provided that if the BURTONS ever decided 
to cease managing or if for cause, the corporation terminated their 
Management Agreement, the BURTONS could sell their Management Contract 
to a third party. 
(The Court should note at this time that there is no 
issue raised as to the saleability or value of BURTON'S 
stock and Management Contract. Plaintiffs did not present 
ary testimony that the value of their purchase was worthless 
or that Defendant defrauded them in any way. In fact, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff testified the value had increased from $80,000.00 ! 
to $125,000.00 (Tr. 90 and 92). Defendant also was willing ! 
to give BURTONS their $80,000.00 back, plus an additional 
$10,000.00, (Tr. 30, FLORENCE BURTON; Tr. 98 and 113 COOMBS), 
j 
if they were unsatisfied with the agreement. J 
The Court should also note that Defendant is not 
claiming that BURTONS should be deprived of their twenty per 
cent interest in the corporation because of their default. 
If the Court should find that BURTONS breached the Manage-
ment Contract, only the Management Contract is affected.) 
BURTONS began their employment as Managers in May of 1972, ai 
a harmonious relationship existed between the parties for most of the 
following year. In November of 1973, COOMBS started construction on 
a second motel directly across the street on the North side, which 
was twice the size of the South side motel and which contained a I 
Convention Center, restaurants, beauty shop and lounge. BURTONS were 
given the first option to purchase the Management rights to the larger 
motel, but declined to do so. Before the first motel was open, 
BURTONS and COOMBS agreed to call the second motel by the same name 
as the first motel in order to capitalize on advertising and so that 
the first motel could be associated with the Convention Center and 
restaurants. 
A new corporation was formed under the name FOUR SEASONS 
MOTOR INN II, INC., and a twenty per cent interest and Management 
Contract was sold to Mr. Derrill Larkin for $160,000.00. It was the 
intent of FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN II, INC 
and the BURTONS to operate the two motels separately even though the 
motels would have the same name and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN I would be 
located physically on the South side of the street and FOUR SEASONS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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MOTOR INN, II, INC. with the Convention Center and related facilities 
on the North side of the street. However, the parties entered into 
negotiations to determine if there would not be a mutual advantage to 
combining the two motels under one management agreement with the 
Plaintiffs as the Managers of the motels and Mr. Larkin, the General 
Manager for the Convention Center. The advantages to such an 
arrangement were discussed and included the following: 
L A reduction of responsibility for the BURTONS to allow 
for eight hour shifts and General Management and sepervision 
responsibilities, rather than a twenty-four hour responsi-
bility then imposed by the original Management Agreement 
for the operation of the motel on the South side. ^ v * 
2. An increase in salary to the BURTONS with a guaranteed 
$1,500.00 per month. * ~ 
3. The association of the smaller forty-unit motel on the 
South side with the larger motel and related facilities such 
as restaurant and Convention Center on the North side for a 
savings in advertising and related costs effected by the 
joint operation and thereby reducing the per-unit cost for 
such items. 
Negotiations continued until the new motel was opened. At 
the insistence of Mrs. BURTON, Mr. COOMBS moved the telephone system 
to the larger unit motel to establish a central telephone system. Mrs. 
BURTON worked with the accountants to develop an accounting method for 
the joint operation. The BURTONS cooperated with COOMBS and other 
employees of FOUR SEASONS I and FOUR SEASONS II in establishing the 
combined management of the two motels. The parties coordinated their 
effort under the apparent assumption that a new contract between the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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BURTONS and the corporation had been, or eventually would be, agreed I 
upon. When the new motel was completed, the BURTONS assumed the j 
management of the combined operation and acted as Managers from J 
April 6, 1973, to April 27, 1973. 
On April 27, 1973, Mrs, BURTON was visibly and audibly com-
plaining to the other employees. (Tr. P. 47, BURTON; Tr. 94 COOMBS) 1 
The complaint of Mrs. BURTON was relative to the status of the new 1 
contract for the management of the two motels under one Management I 
operation. Mr. COOMBS approached Mrs. BURTON in the presence of I 
the other employees and said, "Florence, we can't have this dissentioj 
in the lobby or in the office where customers and other employees 
are being affected - please go across the street and Derrill (Mr. 
Larkin, the owner of twenty per cent of the North side motel) and 
I will come over and talk and we will get this matter settled." 1 
(Tr. 94, COOMBS) | 
Mrs. BURTON left to go to her apartment, which is located 
in the South side motel. Later, during the afternoon of the same I 
day, Mr. COOMBS and Mr. Larkin went to the BURTONS1 apartment to I 
find the reasons why Mrs. BURTON was so upset and to see if they I 
could not convince the BURTONS that they should continue as Managers. 
Mr. COOMBS began by asking, "What is the problem? What is it going 
to take to make you happy and to get this thing settled so you can 
go back to work and feel good about it?" (Tr. 95, COOMBS)(Tr. 28, line 
29, BURTON) (Tr. 101, lines 9 through 11, LARKIN). This was a meetinc 
held to explore alternative offers and to encourage the BURTONS to 
continue to act as Managers. There is conflicting testimony as to 
the terms Defendant offered BURTONS to induce them to stay, but all 
the testimony of all of the witnesses indicates that there were offers 
made back and forth to induce the BURTONS to stay. The BURTONS would Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not agree to any of the terms offered by Defendant and refused to 
continue acting as Managers unless the corporation met their demands 
for more money. Before the meeting terminated, the parties agreed 
to hold a meeting the next day, in an effort to reach an agreement 
satisfactory to all parties* 
The next day on April 28, BURTONS and COOMBS met again in 
the BURTONS1 apartment, Mr. COOMBS testified that he stated at that 
meeting that .if the BURTONS would come back and manage the motels, 
he would agree to an increase in their salary from $1,500.00 to 
$1,800.00 per month and also that Florence would not have to work., 
(Tr. 97, COOMBS). Mr. BURTON confirmed that the meeting was held for 
the purpose of working out "an equitable solution to the problem . . . 
there were offers made back and forth." (Tr. 72, BURTON) Mr. BURTON'S 
final demand was that if they continued in the joint operation manage-
ment, that the BURTONS would require seven and one-half per cent of 
the total gross receipts. Mr. COOMBS indicated that this was excessive. 
The anticipated gross receipts would result in a monthly salary to the 
BURTONS of between $3,500.00 and $4,000.00. 
Mr. COOMBS stated that he "couldn't obligate the motel to 
that kind of an obligation . . . let's just move you across the street. 
Would you then just come back and manage across the street?" (Tr. 98, 
lines 1 through 6, COOMBS) "I told them I would move the telephone 
system at my expense across the street (back to the South side) and 
that Mr. Larkin would continue to manage the eighty units and you 
continue to manage your forty units." (Tr. 98, lines 18 through 20, 
COOMBS) "I said, Okay, then, I will repeat this once more, will you 
not manage your forty-unit motel?" (Tr. 98, COOMBS) 
BURTONS refused to return to the joint operation unless they 
received seven and one-half per cent of the gross from the joint Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
operation. They would not return to managing the forty-unit motel, 
unless the name was changed on the new North side eighty-unit motel, j 
Mr. COOMBS then offered to pay the BURTONS $90,000.00 for their j 
interest and the BURTONS refused, asking $120,000.00. (Tr. 99, COOMBS) 
The meeting ended with BURTONS agreeing to exercise the 
clause in their Management Agreement wherein they would offer their 
interest for sale to a third party if they every wanted to cease j 
acting as Managers. On May 1 a listing agreement was signed with a 
Salt Lake Real Estate firm offering the BURTONS• interest in the fort} 
unit motel for sale for $125,000.00. (Tr. 50-51, BURTON) I 
At the request of Mr. COOMBS, a meeting was arranged between! 
Mr. COOMBS, Mr. Stewart Poelman, attorney for FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, I 
INC., the Plaintiffs and their attorney, David E. West, Esq. At the j 
meeting Mr. COOMBS made the BURTONS four offers (Tr. 112-113, COOMBS). 
1. Offer - work as Managers of the combined J 
operation for a base salary of $1,800.00 or four and one-
half per cent of the gross (which would actually have netted 
BURTONS $2,250.00 per month, estimated.) I 
BURTONS' Reply - Offer rejected. I 
2. Offer - Will you work as Managers of the I 
forty-unit motel under the original contract signed in I 
February, 1973? I 
BURTONSf Reply - BURTONS indicated that they | 
would return to work as Managers of the forty-unit motel 
under the original contract only on three conditions: I 
(a) That COOMBS changes the name of the new motel; 
(b) That COOMBS pay BURTONS' attorney $10,000.00; 
(c) That COOMBS resign as President of FOUR SEASOK 
MOTOR INN, INC. | Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Offer - Will you take $90,000.00 for your 
interest? *-• ., *-, 
BURTONS1 Reply - No, it is worth $120,000,00 , 
(Tr. 129, COOMBS) i 
4, Offer - Will you agree to place the property 
for sale? If you agree to sell the entire motel and/or 
the corporation to a third party, I would agree to give 
BURTONS twenty per cent of the profit or $80,000.00, which-
ever was greater. 
BURTONS' Reply - Refused (Tr. 129, COOMBS) 
All offers were rejected and refused by the BURTONS and they 
thereafter refused to perform as Managers under the joint operation or 
the original Management Contract for the operation of the South side 
motel. 
BURTONS filed this action, claiming Defendants breached the 
original Management Contract of February, 1972. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT 
OF THE ORIGINAL MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT.
 4 
A. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR A FINDING OF FACT BY THE TRIAL 
JUDGE THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT -
APPELLANT BREACHED THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT. 
Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact entered by the Court 
provides as follows: 
"Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., has 
breached its agreement with Plaintiffs by making it effec-
tively impossible for them to continue to perform under 
their Management Contract. " Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This would actually appear to be a Conclusion of Law rather 
than a Finding of Fact. The trial court having refused the request 
of Defendant that the trial court set forth the actual elements and \ 
facts upon which the trial court relied in making the determination 
of breach. The trial court failed to state in written Findings of "j 
Fact one single Finding to support the conclusions of breach. Conse-I 
quently, this court must look to the transcript of record and the 
memorandum decision of court in addition to the actual written Findinc 
of Fact to determine what acts the Defendant committed that would I 
constitute a breach of contract. J 
In the transcript of record there appears to be three state-
ments upon which the trial court must have relied on in concluding th« 
the Management Contract was beached by the Defendant. We respectfully 
submit that the evidence does not constitute a basis in law or fact 
upon which the trial court could have made such a conclusion and 
requests this court to examine said Findings and compare the same to 
the information set forth in the transcript of record. 
It would appear that the statement hereinafter set forth 
is the primary basis for the trial court's decision/ since the lang-
uage used in the court's written Conclusions is very similar to that 
used in this statement (In Court proceeding February 10, Tr. 8, 
Lines 18-22)". . . That FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., through Alan 
i 
Coombs, its principal officer and moving agent, moved the effective 
management of the South side of the operation across the street to 
the North side in violation of the paragraph 1 under grant of manage-
ment rights and duties which granted to the BURTONS the sole and 
exclusive right to operate and manage the FOUR SEASONS MOTEL on the 
property described in the exhibit." (South side motel) 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It would appear that this statement in the transcript of 
the Judge's decision on February 10, 1975, is the basis for the 
alleged breach of contract. The language found in the Conclusions 
is similar to that used in this statement. However, a close reading 
of the same transcript four pages earlier (Page 4) reveals that this 
could not constitute a breach because the BURTONS cooperated in the 
move. On page 4 the Court made the exact opposite finding to the 
above statement on page 8. (Tr. 4, Line 9.-19, Court proceeding) "The 
court further finds that the Plaintiffs knew or reasonably should 
have known that the Defendant intended to build a motel across the 
street; that they knew about it, were advised of it, had an oppor-
tunity to invest and participate in the construction; that they 
declined, that they agreed either tacitly or factually to the con-
struction of the motel across the street; that they went over there 
voluntarily and entered into a working agreement with the Defendant." 
(emphasis added) 
(Tr.5, Lines 203, Court proceedings) "The Court finds that 
shortly thereafter and while the (Burtons) were in operation of and 
managing the units, both the one that they were originally investors 
in and the one across the street, that the relationship broke down. 
The court doesn't find either party in default of the contract before 
that point." (emphasis added) 
The breakdown occurred after the parties had voluntarily 
cooperated to move the offices to the North side in anticipation of 
managing the two motels jointly. Therefore, the court didn't find 
either party in default in moving the effective management of the 
South side across the street to the North side. 
The finding set forth by the court on pages 4 and 5 clearly 
contradicts the finding later set forth on page 8 (Tr. of proceeding). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no written finding of fact indicating which of the contra-
dicting statements that the court ultimately takes as true. We cannot 
readily assume that the court did intend to base its conclusion of .j 
breach by the Defendant by this act, (i.e., of moving the operating .! 
facilities from the South side to the North side). Furthermore, the • 
I 
trial court's finding that neither party was in default in moving ] 
the operating facilities from the South side to the North side was 
fully supported by the evidence and testimony at the trial. Neither 
the Plaintiff or the Defendant presented any evidence, testimony or 
claim that would suggest the BURTONS did not approve, support and 
assist in the moving of the operating facilities to the North side. 
Since the Court found no fault with either party in the 
moving of the office to the North side, then what act did the Defen-
dant commit that breached the Management Contract? We ask this 
court to turn its attention to page 5 of the transcript of court 
proceedings. 
" . . . they were ordered back to their side of the 
street. That is a breach of the original agreement 
between the parties." 
(Tr. 5, Lines 16-17, Court) 
It is inconceivable that the trial court could consider 
this act by the Defendant COOMBS to constitute the act which made it 
"effectively impossible" for the BURTONS to perform their Management 
Contract. The original Management Agreement was to manage a forty-
unit motel on the South side, wherein Plaintiff BURTON resided. 
When Mr. COOMBS "ordered" Mrs. BURTON back to the forty-unit motel 
across the street, he was, in fact, telling her to go to the side 
where she had a Management Contract. The only way he would be in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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breach was to have ordered her not to go across the street. There 
is absolutely no evidence that Mr. COOMBS denied the BURTONS' access 
to the motel in which they had a Management Contract, but rather the 
BURTONS were merely asked to leave the North side in which they had 
no interest. The ordering of Mrs. BURTON to go across the street 
could only constitute a termination of the combined Management 
Agreement, an agreement which was never fully concluded. The court 
should also note that only Mrs. BURTON was asked to leave the North 
side lobby, and neither Mr. or Mrs. BURTON interpreted Mr. COOMBS' 
act as an intent to terminate their employment. * * 
The true purpose of asking Mrs. BURTON to leave the North 
lobby was to relieve a situation which was disturbing normal business 
practices, and to give Mrs. BURTON time to cool off. The actions of 
the parties after the "order" to go across the street are probative 
in demonstrating that Mr. COOMBS' action could not be grounds for 
breach of contract, since there was no termination intended by COOMBS 
and no termination interpreted by the BURTONS. We would first ask 
the court to read Mr. COOMBS' testimony regarding his alleged ordering 
of Mrs. BURTON across the street. (Tr. 94, Lines 1-11, 20-25, COOMBS) 
Mrs. BURTON confirmed Mr. COOMBS' testimony that she was upsetting 
the help, (Tr. 46, Lines 1-5 BURTON) and visibly unhappy. (Tr. 28, 
Lines 27-28, BURTON) Mrs. BURTON did in fact go across the street 
and Mr. COOMBS and Mr. Larkin followed shortly thereafter. Mr. BURTON 
could not attend the full meeting because he was still working on the 
North side. (Tr. 29, Lines 26-28, BURTON) The testimony of Mrs. 
BURTON when Mr. COOMBS came across the street is as follows: 
(Tr. 28, Lines 29-30, BURTON) "The first words Alan said was, "What 
does it take to make you happy?" Mr. Larkin testifies to a similar 
statement by Mr. Coombs: (Tr. 161, Line 9-10, Larkin) "Mr. COOMBS Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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opened by saying, "We see you have a problem, what can we do to 
work it out?" Mr. COOMBS testified that he stated as follows: 
(Tr, 95, Lines 15-18, COOMBS) "What is the problem, what is it going 
to take to make you happy and get this thing settled so you can go 
back to work and feel good about it?" 
A discussion then followed wherein various offers and 
counter-offers were explored, (Tr. 95 and 96, COOMBS) i 
It is clear that these statements do not carry any threat 
of termination nor did BURTONS consider themselves terminated. Mr. 
BURTON was still working and performing managerial duties. Mr. COOMBS 
did not tell them to "get out of the South side" or "yourfre fired 
from your management contract". He was there to solve the problem. 
According to Mrs. BURTON, he asked them, "What would it take to make 
you happy?" Mr. COOMBS wanted them back working. He was proposing 
terms, compromising, asking them to come back to work. Termination 
of their employment was not even considered. It was just a matter 
of coming to terms so that the relationship would continue. 
The court should note that the negotiations at the 
April 28th meeting were attempts to induce BURTONS to manage 
the combined motels. The next day, however, on April 29th, another 
meeting was held between the parties and at this meeting, Mr. COOMBS 
offered to move the telephone switchboard back to the old office 
where the BURTONS could operate the forty-unit motel under the 
original Management Agreement. (Tr. 98, Lines 1-6, 19-21 COOMBS) 
We invite the court to read the testimony given by Mr. COOMBS 
(Tr. 96-97, COOMBS) Mr. BURTON (Tr. 71, BURTON) and Mrs. BURTON 
(Tir, 30, BURTON) to determine for themselves that at this meeting 
on April 29th there was no suggestion by Mr. COOMBS that the original 
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solely to induce the BURTONS to continue as managers either on 
the North side as Managers of both units, or the South side, under 
the original agreement. * 
Was there any evidence presented by the BURTONS which 
would indicate COOMBS made it "effectively impossible" for them 
to manage the South side? Only one paragraph on page 104, BURTON 
states that the office equipment, including the telephone was moved 
to the North side. (The discussion on Point I already shows that 
they cooperated in this move.) BURTON further states on Line 30 . 
that on June 12, a wooden stake and neon sign was placed which said 
"Office across the street". But the court should not fail to note 
that this was placed a month after the May 14 meeting when BURTONS 
had already rejected COOMBS1 proposal that he move the telephone switch-
board back to the South side and re-establish the office there. •;. \ 
Coombs did everything "effectively possible" to induce BURTONS 
back to the original Management Agreement and BURTONS refused. We 
challenge the court to find any testimony presented by Plaintiff 
that would support a finding that Defendant made it effectively 
impossible for BURTONS to continue to perform the Management Agreement. 
In fact, the BURTONS refused to perform the original 
Management Agreement because they wanted to sue COOMBS for damages 
over the full life of the contract . (Tr. 75, Line 18) BURTONS didn't 
want to work. (Tr. 72, Lines 13-3- and Tr. 99, Lines 17-24) and 
that they could get over $200,000.00 without ever working again. 
(Tr, 127, Line 26-29). COOMBS offered to let them work but their 
trial strategy was already planned. 
If the act of ordering Mrs. BURTON across the street was 
in fact the breaching act, we find that the trial court has gone 
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cannot be supported in law or fact* 
, The question still remains, "What act did the Defendant 
commit which constituted the breach?" 
We now ask the court to focus on the time period of 
April 29th until May 14th, It is in this time period that the 
breach would have had to occur since it is obvious that neither 
the act of moving the office to the North side nor the act of 
asking Mrs, BURTON to leave the North side could be the breaching act 
It is concerning this time period that the trial court made the 
following finding: 
*••- •< , "Any offer of re-employment made by Defendant, 
Alan H. Coombs acting for the Defendant, Four Seasons 
Motor Inn, Inc., was conditioned upon the Plaintiffs1 
< operating the motel under an addendum agreement to which 
the Plaintiffs had not agreed. 
•^ , (Supplemental Findings) 
We again implore the court to consider this ruling in 
light of the transcript of the record. This finding completely 
i 
ignores the unrebutted testimony of Mr. COOMBS. ! 
Mr. COOMBS testified that he returned to the BURTONS1 
apartment on April 2 9th. During this meeting, the various offers 
were again discussed in an attempt to induce BURTONS to act as 
Managers of the joint operation of the North side. (Tr. 96-97, 
COOMBS). All efforts in that regard failed. Mr. COOMBS then 
testified that he was willing to move the telephone system back to 
the South side if they would just come back and manage their own 
forty units. (Tr. 98, Lines 1-6, 18-30, COOMBS) This was an uncon-
ditional offer to set up a separate office on the South side so that 
the BURTONS could perform the original Management Agreement. Again, 
this was an unconditional offer to perform the original Management 
Agreement, This had nothing to do with an addendum agreement* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. COOMBS further testified that on May 14, he made 
the same unconditional offer to let BURTONS perform the original 
Management Agreement in the presence of Mr. West, Mr. Burton and 
Mr. Stuart Poelman. (Tr. 112, Lines 26-28, COOMBS). Mr. Poelman 
was then "worn for the purpose of supporting Mr. COOMBS' unconditional 
offer. After an objection to the use of Mr. Poelman as a witness, 
it was agreed that Mr. Poelman would not testify on condition that 
Mr. COOMBS1 testimony remain unrebutted. (Tr. 186, Lines 9-13, 
POELMAN) •>: 
And, in fact, his testimony was not rebutted by the •••••••• 
Plaintiffs even though they had the opportunity to get back on the 
witness stand and deny this unconditional offer. 
That the fact trier may discount testimony of self-
interested party is undisputed, but there must be some recognition 
of the testimony and good reasons why the trial Judge should not 
believe the witness. The general statement of the law on unrebutted 
testimony is found in 81 Am.Jr. 2d "Witnesses" § 660, which states 
as follows: 
"It' is established as a general rule that when a dis- * 
interested witness who is in no way discredited by other 
evidence, testifies to a fact within the knowledge of 
such witness which is not in itself improbably, or in 
conflict with other evidence, the witness is to be 
believed and particularly where his testimony is fully 
corroborated. A like rule has been applied to the 
uncontradicted testimony of a party or interested witness." 
See also 30 Am.Jur. 2d "Evidence" § 1084, weight of uncontradicted 
testimony of interested party. 
As a corollary to the above, the principle has been announced 
that testimony given by an interested party should not be wholly 
disregarded or arbitrarily rejected, but should be accepted as proof 
of the issue for which it is tendered where it is uncontradicted Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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» 
or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to knowledge or 
contradictory within itself. The Utah Supreme Court discussed this 
issue at length in the case of American Scale Mfg. Co, v. Zee, 120 
Utah 402, 235 P 2d 361 (1951). In the Zee case the Plaintiff brought 
suit to recover the costs of scales sold to Defendant for $837.90 < 
j 
down and the balance in monthly installments. The Defendant refused 
to pay the balance and counterclaimed for his downpayment back on the 
grounds that Plaintiff's salesman was guilty of fraudulent promises 
at the time of sale. The trial court held that Plaintiff did not mak< 
any misrepresentations to the Defendant. 
Defendant assigned this finding as error and contended that 
the issue of fraud was proven by clear and convincing evidence and 
asked for a reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
holding and stated in pertinent part as follows: 
"We recognize the fact that trial Judge is in a better 
position to observe the manner and demeanor and adjudge 
the credibility of a witness than we are and we recognize j 
the law that the trial Judge can disbelieve a witness in I 
part or entirely under certain circumstances. \ 
"Our specific problem is, however, under what circumstances 
can the trial Judge disbelieve the positive and uncontradict 
testimony of a witness on a given subject when there is no 
other evidence whatever on the same subject. 
"The general rule as to the effect of positive uncontradicte* 
testimony is found in National Bank of Commerce of N.Y. v. 
Bottolfson, 55 S.D 196, 225 N.W. 385, 386, 69 A.L.R.892, 
wherein the court said, 'where the testimony of a witness is 
uncontradicted and not inherently improbably and there are 
no circumstances tending to raise a doubt of its truth, the 
facts so proven should be taken as conclusively established 
and verdict directed or decision entered accordingly." 
The Utah court then went on to discuss the circumstances 
when this rule would not be followed and looked at the facts of the 
case to determine whether the Zee case would fall within this rule. 
The court then stated, 
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"After examining the record closely, we cannot find any 
circumstances that would raise a doubt as to the truth of 
Defendant's testimony. It seems reasonable and consistent 
with truth to us. We hold, therefore, that Defendant's 
testimony was clear and convincing in support of his 
Answer and Counterclaim." 
We request the court to examine the record of the case at 
bar. The circumstances surrounding the facts clearly support 
Defendant's testimony that he made two unconditional offers to re-
open the South side motel lobby. The testimony of BURTONS and COOMBS 
is clear and convincing that COOMBS never intended to terminate the 
BURTONS' employment and made many offers to induce them to work. 
The defense offered to corroborate the testimony of Mr. 
COOMBS by proferring the testimony of Mr. Stuart Poelman regarding 
the negotiations and offer of May 14. Counsel for Defendants challenged 
the Plaintiffs to rebut the COOMBS testimony, but the Plaintiffs chose 
to remain silent. 
How can the trial court ignore these offers and find that 
any offer of reemployment was conditioned upon Plaintiffs operating 
under an Addendum Agreement? Can the trial Judge disregard COOMBS' 
and Poelman's positive and uncontradicted testimony? We contend that 
the rule expressed in the Zee case must be applied in the instant case. 
Why did the court ignore the testimony? We think it is 
important to ask this question since it is possible that the trial 
Judge missed this testimony altogether. It is one thing for the trial 
Judge to hear testimony, understand it and assess it for the weight 
it carries. However, it is an altogether different problem if the 
trial court did not hear the testimony or did not understand the 
testimony or mistakenly believed that COOMBS referred to the Addendum 
Agreement when he referred to the original Management Agreement. 
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issuance of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 4. 
The contradictions and vagueness found in the court's transcript is 
a strong indication that the complex issues became confused and many 
of the facts presented at the trial were undoubtedly forgotten by 
the court by the time the court made its decision, # 
We believe the complex nature of the testimony in discussing 
the North-side South-side bifurcation and original agreements and the 
Addendum Agreement may have created confusion in the Judge's mind and 
he did not fully comprehend that COOMBS was referring to the South sic 
when he made the unconditional offers to let BURTONS manage under the 
original Management Agreement. 
The manner in which the trial Judge write his findings 
indicates that he was not aware of the unconditional offers made by 
COOMBS, The trial court simply does not acknowledge in his findings 
that he was aware of such offers or that he knew of such offers. He 
did not chose to disbelieve COOMBS, he simply failed to understand 
! 
or remember COOMBS1 testimony. If, in fact, the trial court Judge ' 
made his ruling under a mistaken assumption, then the court should 
remand the case back to the lower court and require the court to 
clarify its position on this critical issue. 
Ultimately, though no finding exists on this point, COOMBS1 
testimony remains unrebutted. The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to 
deny or otherwise explain the testimony of COOMBS on the unconditional 
offer, but declined to do so and the testimony must stand. 
Thus, the trial court erred in finding that any offer of 
reemployment was conditioned upon Plaintiffs operating the motel under 
an Addendum Agreement. The testimony is clear and unrebutted that 
there were offers made to the Plaintiffs by Defendant to establish the 
South side office and allow them to perform according to the original 
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agreement. The Defendant has no argument with the trial court's 
conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not required to work on the North 
side under an Addendum Agreement. We agree that there is no enforceable 
agreement which would require BURTONS to manage the combined units. 
However, once it was determined that the parties could not agree 
on the terms to a new contract, the BURTONS had the obligation to 
accept COOMBS' offer to reinstate the office in the old motel and 
to commence performance under the original Management Agreement. 
In summary of Point I, it would therefore appear conclusive 
that the Findings of Fact entered by the court bear no relationship 
to the testimony and evidence and are the result of error and/or 
confusion. Since the Findings were contradictory, incorrect and 
unsupported by the testimony, the conclusion of the Court that the 
Defendant breached the original Management Agreement is clearly 
wrong. * *" 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND PLAINTIFFS IN 
BREACH OF THE ORIGINAL MANAGEMENT CONTRACT. 
The Management Agreement entered into in February of 1972, 
by and between FOUR SEASONS MOTOR, INC., Defendant-Appellant herein, 
therein referred to as "Corporation", and HERBERT and FLORENCE BURTON, 
defines the responsibilities of each of the parties thereto. The 
agreement provides among other things the following: 
GRANT OF MANAGEMENT DUTIES; . . . 
Paragraph 2-B "Upon completion of said motel, BURTONS or 
their designated assistant shall occupy the Manager's 
• '-, quarters and shall devote their best efforts to the manage-
ment and operation of said motel and the office thereof on 
a twenty-four hour daily schedule." 
Paragraph 2-C "BURTONS shall have the responsibility to 
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orderly condition at all times, in keeping with the 
highest standards of maintenance and operation of the 
motel and hotel-industry." 
The records and evidence in the trial court proceedings 
i 
show that the BURTONS did undertake and discharge the responsibilities 
imposed by the Management Agreement from the time of completion of 
the South side motel up to the point in time when they joined in the 
discussions and efforts to combine the management responsibilities 
on the South side motel with the management responsibilities on the 
North side motel. Reference is made to the narrative as more 
particularly set forth in Point I hereinabove set forth as to the 
date, time and sequence of these various events. 
i 
Appellant contends that the following undisputed facts 
establish the basis for the breach of the Management contract by the 
Plaintiffs: 
1. On February 28, 1973, they left their responsibilities 
as Managers of the motel without prior notice thereof and they there-
i 
after repeatedly refused to return. 
2. On Sunday, April 29, 1973, the Plaintiffs told Mr. COOMB 
that they would not return to their duties as Managers of the first 
motel under the terms of the written Management Agreement, unless the 
Defendants were willing to change the name of the second motel, a 
condition which was not a responsibility of the corporation under 
the terms of the written Management Agreement. 
3. On May 14, 1973, in the offices of David E. West, Esq., 
Plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. COOMBS gave the Plaintiffs the option of 
returning to the management of the first motel under the terms of 
the original written Management Agreement or of reassuming the 
management of the joint operation of both motels under the terms of 
*.i„4~
 rtrai *m-«apjment in the "addendum" (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5). At 
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that time, the Plaintiffs rejected both proposals, indicating that 
they would not return to the management of the first motel unless the 
Defendants agreed: 
(a) To change the name of the second motel; 
(b) To have Mr. COOMBS resign as President of 
the first corporation; and 
(c) To pay attorneys' fees to the Plaintiffs1 
attorneys in the amount of $10,000.00. 
Reference is made again to the fact that this testimony was 
presented to the trial court and was uncontroverted by Plaintiffs. 
4. By letter dated April 2, 1974, Mr. COOMBS in behalf of 
the FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. - Appellant, again tendered the 
unconditional offer to the Plaintiffs to return to the management of 
the first motel under the terms of the written Management Agreement. 
Plaintiffs rejected said tender by letter from their counsel to 
counsel for Defendants, dated April 12, 1974, and indicated that they 
did not intend to return to the management of the motel, but rather, 
stated, We intend to stand on our claim for damages (Tr• f|3f€»6*«b3V 
5. Both Plaintiffs testified during the first day of trial 
that they could not return to their duties as Managers of the motel. 
These statements were clear, unequivocal and unconditional. 
A contract may be breached either by a simple non-performance 
of essential conditions of the contract or by an advance repudiation 
of the"contract which constitutes a present total breach of a contract 
to be performed in the future or over a period of time. Plaintiffs 
are guilty of both types of breach. Their breach by non-performance 
is clear by their failure to perform their management duties and 
their repudiation of the contract is made clear by each of the rest 
of their actions as -ine+- annn.«%.^ *.-j 
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The acts of the Plaintiffs and the lawful effects thereof 
can best be analyzed by first reviewing the law with regard to the 
breach of a contract and its consequences. A clear statement of the 
law'is set forth at 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, Section 448, as follows: 
"According to the general view prevailing now in nearly 
all American jurisdictions, where there has been an 
anticipatory breach of the contract by one party thereto 
the other party may treat the entire contract as broken 
and may immediately sue for the breach. An anticipatory 
breach of contract is one committed before the time has 
come when there is a present duty of performance and is the 
outcome of words or acts evincing an intention to refuse 
performance in the future . . . In many cases, however, 
assuming to apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach, 
the breach involved is a present breach accompanied by a 
repudiation, and the real question involved is whether 
the breach is total and whether damages, as for a total 
breach, are recoverable. 
"In ascertaining whether an anticipatory breach of contract 
has been committed by a party, it is the intention mani-
fested by his acts which controls, not his secret intention. 
Moreover, in order to predicate a cause of action upon an 
anticipatory breach, the words or conduct evidencing the 
t- breach must be unequivocal and positive in nature." 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly adopts the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach. Such is reaffirmed in the recent case of 
University Club v. Invesco Holding Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 
P.2d 29 (1972), where the court stated: 
"The recognized rule is that where one party definitely 
indicates that he cannot or will not perform a condition 
of a contract, the other party is not required to uselessly 
abide time, but may act upon the breached condition. In-
deed, in appropriate circumstances, he ought to do so to 
mitigate damages." 
Fitting the above declarations of law to the facts of this 
case, it is clear that the Plaintiffs engaged in both a present bread 
arid an anticipatory breach of their contract, first by leaving work 
and failing to ever return and second by their expressed and implied 
renunciation of the contract as a whole. Such a renunciation is 
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evidenced by (1) the fact that the Plaintiffs have, since May 1, 
1973, maintained a consistent position that they would not return 
to the management of the motel; and (2) the Plaintiffs1 clear, 
unequivocal and unconditional sworn testimony that they could not 
return to the management of the motel; and (3) the Plaintiffs1 
requirement that additional terms of the Management Contract be 
agreed to by the Defendants before they would perform their manage-
ment duties. 
. The position taken by the Plaintiffs.that they would not 
return to ttie management of the motel after they left it about May 1, 
1973, is demonstrated by the fact that they have not returned. It 
is also demonstrated by the fact that they filed a lawsuit seeking 
damages rather than restitution. The letter signed by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, dated April 12, 1974, makes it further clear that the 
Plaintiffs did not intend to return to the management of the motel, 
but instead were going to stand on their claim for damages. 
The Plaintiffs' renunciation of the Management Contract 
could not have been more clear or unequivocal than was stated by 
the Plaintiffs in their sworn testimony during the first day of trial. 
They stated very simply and unconditionally that they could not 
return to the management of the motel. This was not only a 
reaffirmation of their prior position, but was in itself a declara-
tion of repudiation. It was there clearly confirmed that the 
Plaintiffs did not want a reinstatement of the contract since they 
could not perform it. 
The Utah court has also made it clear that whenever a 
party insists that the other party perform additional acts or gives 
additional concessions beyond the terms of the contract itself before 
-25-
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the party demanding such concessions will himself perform the 
conditions of the contract, such conduct constitutes a repudiation 
of the contract. In the case of Jordan v. Madsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 
£.570, 573 (1926), the Utah court stated: 
"It, of course, is well settled that a renunciation 
or repudiation of a contract by one party before the 
time fixed for performance constitutes a breach and 
gives an immediate right of action to the adverse party. 
5 Page on Contracts, Section 2885; 13 C.J.651. It 
also is well settled that if one of the -parties to a 
contract notifies the other party that he will not perform 
unless such other assents to a material modification of 
the contract, or by the addition of new terms, such conduct 
amounts to a renunciation of the contract. 5 Page on Con-
tracts, Section 2904* The breach here as alleged operated 
as a discharge of the contract, which gave the Plaintiff, 
who was not in default, the right to ignore the contract 
as a basis of his rights and to sue as he did in quasi 
contract to recover reasonable compensation for what he 
furnished in partial performance of the contract (5 Page 
on Contracts, Section 3023) - here the value of his old 
car, alleged to be $900. The renunciation discharged the 
Plaintiff from further performance. 5 Page, Section 2883; 
13 C.J. 653. (emphasis added) 
Thus, the fact that the Plaintiffs both on Sunday, April 29, 
1972, and on May 14, 1972, required additional concessions from the 
Defendants before they would proceed with their performance of the 
Management Agreement constitutes a renunciation of the contract under 
the law as stated by the Utah court. 
It appears clear that the Plaintiffs not only failed to 
perform their contract, but renounced the contract so as to con-
stitute a total breach thereof. 
An explanation of the remedies available against a party 
who has breached a contract through renunciation is set forth 
at 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, Section 449, as follows: 
"Nearly all the courts considering the question have 
reached the conclusion that a renunciation or repudiation 
of a contract before the time for performance, which 
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refusal to perform it at any time, gives the 
adverse party the option to treat the entire 
contract as broken and to sue immediately for damages 
as for a total breach. There is. no necessity in such 
case for a tender of performance, or compliance with 
conditions precedent, or waiting for the time of per-
formance to arrive, although this is optional. If the 
injured party does not wish to bring such an immediate 
suit for damages, he may elect between two other alter-
natives - that is, (1) to treat the contract as still 
binding and wait until the time arrives for its perfor-
mance by the promisor, and at such time to bring an action 
on the contract; or (2) to rescind the contract and sue for 
money paid or the value of services or property furnished. 
Also, if the contract is of that general class which equity 
will specifically enforce, the injured party may, at his 
election, sue for specific performance notwithstanding 
that the time has not arrived for complete performance of 
the contract. (emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this line of reasoning 
in the case of Jordan v. Madsen, supra, when it announced, as quoted 
above: "The breach here as alleged operated as a discharge of the 
contract, which gave the Plaintiff, who was not in default, the right 
to ignore the contract on a basis of his rights and to sue as he did 
in quasi contract to recover reasonable compensation for what he 
furnished in partial performance of the contract . . . the renunciation 
discharged the Plaintiff from further performance." 252 Pac at 573. 
(emphasis added) 
It should be noted that the Defendants have appropriately 
applied to the court for the alternative remedy of rescission. In the 
Pre-Trial Order, the First Counterclaim asserts: 
"Defendant Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc. claims that 
Plaintiffs have breached the written Management Agreement 
which forms the basis for the First Cause of Action under 
the Plaintiffs' claims herein and that because of such 
said breach of contract on the part of the Plaintiffs, 
Defendants are relieved from any further obligation of 
performance under said contract." 
Defendants did, at the time of the trial, elect the remedy 
of recision and requested the court to issue its order declaring that 
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I 
the Defendants were relieved from any further obligation of perfor- \ 
mance under the Management Agreement, 
Because the method of operating the motels was substantially j 
changed just prior to the Plaintiffs' refusal to workf (this being I 
occasioned by the effort to operate jointly under the proposed • 
addendum agreement), Defendants were not able to furnish the court j 
with a precise calculation of the extent of their damagee There was I 
evidence produced by the Plaintiffs that the apartment which the i 
i 
Plaintiffs continued to occupy even while they refused to work had
 { 
a rental value of about $250.00 per month. There is also evidence j 
that the corporation stood the costs of utilities used by the . 
Plaintiffs during that period. The Defendants produced evidence l 
concerning expenses which they had to incur to hire and train addi- \ 
I 
tional employees to assume the work which the Plaintiffs were supposed 
to have been performing and both Mr. COOMBS and Mr. Larkin testified j 
concerning the probably loss of business and inefficiencies of 
operation which were occasioned by the Plaintiffs' unexpected termin-j 
ation of services. Mr. Larkin explained that because of the BURTONS' 
non-performance, he was required to assume the motel management even ! 
l 
though he was not qualified to do so, and that by doing so, he was 
required to neglect his duties as Manager of the Convention Center ' 
and restaurants, which, in his opinion, resulted in a loss of business 
and was a significant factor in requiring the sale of the Convention 
Center and restaurants at a significant loss. Based upon such evidenc 
the court is in a position to award some or at least nominal damages 
to the Defendants as well as their attorneys' fees. 
There is ample justification for the award of attorneys' 
fees to the Defendants. The Management Contract provides for same. 
^J_ ~J. ~4.^ v*>, -*+. i^ai-Y^ Q f l i o r ^ n f • • 
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HIn the event either party hereto resorts to 
legal action in order to enforce the terms hereof, 
the defaulting party agrees to pay all costs incurred 
in such action, -including a reasonable attorneys1 fee." 
Obviously, the Defendants have been put to great costs 
and legal expense in this case. Counsel has been required to 
travel to St. George on four different occasions/ to bring witnesses 
into court including one who had to travel from Salt Lake City and 
counsel has engaged in hundreds of hours in connection with confer-
ences , preparation, research, depositions, trial, etc. Plaintiffs 
did, at the time of trial, stipulate that the reasonable value of 
the attorneys1 fees to be awarded was in the sum of $10,000.00. 
Defendants respectfully request the court to award said sum as a 
part of their judgment against the Plaintiffs. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT, 
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., AS FOLLOWS: 
(a) There is no basis for the assessment of damages 
against this Defendant, there is no basis in fact or law for deter-
mining a breach of the contract; 
Reference is made to the narrative and argument set forth 
in Point I hereinabove set forth. Absent a showing of breach based 
upon appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found in 
the evidence, the Court was not justified in assessing damages. 
(b) The amount of damages assessed are excessive and no 
basis for the amount of Judgment entered by the Court can be estab-
lished from the facts or evidence. 
The determination by the Court that the Plaintiffs were 
entitled to relief in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for each month 
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that they were "effectively deprived" of the right to manage the 
South side motel is likened to a magician pulling a rabbit out of I 
a hat. The trial court had no basis whatsoever upon which to ' 
predicate the sum of $1,000.00 per month and to award such an amount j 
for the period of time awarded by the Court was erroneous both as I 
i 
to the amount and the period of time. The evidence was clear and ! 
uncontroverted that the BURTONS were invited to return to the manage-i 
ment of the South side motel on April 28, 1973# April 29, 1913, on 
May 14, 1973, and by letter of April 2, 1974. 
i 
The sum of $1,000.00/ the maximum fixed amount in the , 
management contract, per month, determined by the Court disregards 
J 
the obligation imposed upon the Plaintiffs to mitigate any such loss 
that they would otherwise incur, it being established that the BURTONS 
and each of them, refused to seek out and obtain employment. The i 
evidence showing that a proper mitigation of damage by the Plaintiffs 
would have resulted in their having earned more money than they would 
likely have been paid under the Management Contract. 
In the event, for some reason, this Court were to find from 
the record and facts that Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR, INC., was 
responsible in some manner for the breach of the Management Contract, 
and that some award of damage should be made to the BURTONS, it is 
clear from the record and evidence that the amount awarded by the 
court is excessive. By letter of April 2, 1974, the Plaintiffs were 
unconditionally invited to return to the management of the motel on 
the South side and to assume and discharge their responsibility as 
imposed therein. No basis whatsoever exists to determine that a 
breach of the Management Contract on the part of the Defendant-Appellc 
existed from that date forward and the maximum period that the trial 
court should have considered in evaluating the impact of a breach wou! Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have been from the period April, 1973, to April, 1974. Thereafter, 
and assuming for discussion purposes, that the $1,000.00 per month 
found by the trial court to be the amount of damages was supported 
by the evidence, the Plaintiffs were obligated to mitigate their 
damages. It is noted that the BURTONS were allowed to live in the 
apartment at the motel during this period of time, enjoy the use of 
utilities and related benefits at no cost to them. Consequently, I 
the trial court erred in failing to offset the per month amount I 
determined as damages by the benefits received by the BURTONS during I 
the period of alleged breach and by the amount of income that the I 
BURTONS could have reasonably earned from outside and available I 
employment. I 
POINT IV. I 
THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 
WAS A BINDING AND EFFECTIVE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, PLAINTIFFS -
AND DEFENDANT, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., WAS IN ERROR IN THAT IT ( 
WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE EVIDENCE, OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE 
PLEADINGS AND CONTRARY TO THE REQUESTS OF ANY PARTY TO THE ACTION AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. 
The Plaintiffs were seeking a determination by the trial 1 
court that the Management Contract was breached and that said 1 
Plaintiffs were entitled to damages. The Defendants were seeking a 1 
determination by the court that the Management Contract was breached 1 
and that they, the Defendants were entitled to damages. No request |f 
was made by any party or reserved in the Pre-Trial Order or contended 
as an element of relief requested or sought by any party at the end | 
of the trial that the Management Agreement should be considered as 1 
being in full force and effect. The record being replete with indi- II 
If 
cations by the Plaintiffs that they could not continue with the If 
Managment Agreement. I] 
The decision of the court to impose upon the parties a || 
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determination that the Management Agreement was in full force and 
effect was in error. It was beyond the scope of the evidence and 
contrary to the desire of any party to the action, 
CONCLUSION 
Having failed in their proof that the Defendants had 
renounced the Management Agreement so as to justify a remedy based 
on anticipatory breach, the Plaintiffs are left without any evidence 
to sustain a claim of present breach by reason of non-performance. 
The most that can be said is that the Defendants refused to pay 
compensation to the Plaintiffs during the period they refused to 
work. The Defendants had every right to do so under the law. 
Even if Defendants had breached the contract by non-per-
formance, the evidence shows that a proper mitigation of damage by 
the Plaintiffs would have resulted in their having earned more money 
than they would have likely been paid under the Management Contract. 
Thus, they incurred no damage. Moreover, the Plaintiffs admitted 
their design to attempt to enhance rather than mitigate their 
damages by refusing to seek or accept other employment until 
after the trial. This is sufficient justification for the court to 
refuse to award any damages to the Plaintiffs. 
On the other hand, much of the same evidence which 
want to prove that Defendants had not breached the Management 
Contract also provided proof that the Plaintiffs had themselves 
breached the contract by refusing to perform, by requiring additional 
concessions from the Defendants not contained in the contract and 
by outright statements that they would not and could not return to 
their Management duties. 
-32-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The law supports the Defendants ' claim that the renuncia-
tion of the contract by the Plaintiffs entitle them to rescind the 
contract. This the defendants have pleaded in the Pre-Trial Order 
and have asserted at trial as their chosen remedy. In the alternative, 
however, Defendants are entitled to a Judgment awarding them damage 
in some amount, and, in addition, an award of attorneys1 fees as 
provided by the express terms of the Management Agreement and in the 
stipulated amount of $10,000.00. 
The court should not fail to consider the effect of the 
court's granting to the Defendants all that Defendants pray for in 
this case. Such will not deprive the Plaintiffs of their ownership 
interest in one of St. George's finest motels. The Plaintiffs will 
continue to possess all of their rights as stockholders, including 
their right to receive twenty (20%) per cent of all profits. 
Moreover, in connection with such stockholder rights, they will 
retain all claims which they may have in connection with their 
stockholders derivative suit filed with this Court under Civil 
No. 5165. 
Defendant-Appellant respectfully prays that this Court I 
reverse the decision heretofore entered by the trial court or in 
the alternative that the case be remanded back to the District Court 
for a new trial. 
DATED this &**" day of CJ U^uu , 1976. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CLINE, JACKSON, MAYER & BENSON 
BY1 '<*o tz^^o^ 
<^^ 
JOSEPH E.'JACKSON, ESQ., of 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
13JUM1977 
BRIGKAM YOUNG UKlVEUSitY 
J. Reuben CiCih L w School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
